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Abstract
The NCAA’s year-in-residency requirement dictates that any
student-athlete who plays a revenue-generating sport and transfers
to another Division I institution must complete one full academic
year before regaining eligibility for competition. While NCAA
regulations like the year-in-residency requirement restrict output,
the “pro-competitive presumption” precedent established by the
Supreme Court mandates that NCAA regulations like the year-inresidency requirement are deemed inherently pro-competitive, and
automatically not in violation of the Sherman Act. Importantly, the
“pro-competitive presumption” was established in dictum and the
1085
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concept of stare decisis has a limited application in the field of
antitrust law. For these reasons, among others, lower federal courts
should follow the lead of the Ninth Circuit in O’Bannon v. NCAA
and narrow the “pro-competitive presumption” precedent from
below. Although precedent may not be on the lower federal courts
side, the lower federal courts have the power and opportunity to
narrow NCAA antitrust from below and force the NCAA to fully
defend its anti-competitive regulations in a court of law.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”)
reported more than $1 billion in annual revenue for the 2017 fiscal
year, a number that only continues to grow as the number of
collegiate students and student-athletes increase.1 Although the
NCAA is an enormous economic market, federal courts generally
grant the NCAA an antitrust exemption because of the “amateur”
designation given to college athletes.2 In other words, the amateur
designation allows the NCAA to profit immensely off the backs of
student-athletes, while student-athletes are left with few options,
especially when wishing to transfer schools.3
Student-athletes are considered amateurs and therefore the
NCAA regulations that aim to promote amateurism are generally
deemed to be presumptively procompetitive.4 Because the
regulations are considered procompetitive, federal courts generally
refuse to apply the antitrust framework when evaluating challenges
to NCAA regulations.5 While the NCAA faced antitrust claims
before, it has prevailed on nearly all regulations with any
connection to amateurism and eligibility.6 By declaring NCAA
* J.D. Candidate, UIC John Marshall Law School, 2020; M.A., Eastern
Illinois University, 2017; B.S., Eastern Illinois University, 2016.
1. Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Reports Revenue of More Than $1 Billion in 2017,
USA TODAY (Mar. 7, 2018), www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2018/03/07
/ncaa-reports-revenues-more-than-1-billion-2017/402486002/.
2. See John Niemayer, The End of an Era: The Mounting Challenges to the
NCAA's Model of Amateurism, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 883, 899 (2015) (analyzing how
dicta in the Court’s decision in NCAA v. Bd. of Regents has formed binding
precedent rejecting suits challenging NCAA amateurism rules); see also Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102
(1984) (stating "[i]n order to preserve the character and quality of the [NCAA's]
'product,' athletes must not be paid, must be required to attend class, and the
like”).
3. See Kendall K. Johnson, Enforceable Fair and Square: The Right of
Publicity, Unconscionability, and NCAA Student-Athlete Contracts, 19 SPORTS
L. J. 1, 12 (2012) (examining the NCAA’s lucrative television and advertising
contracts and the increased dissatisfaction of student-athletes).
4. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117.
5. Deppe v. NCAA, 893 F.3d 498, 503-04 (7th Cir. 2018).
6. See Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 347-48 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding the
NCAA scholarship limit and prohibition on multi-year scholarships are
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regulations presumptively procompetitive, federal courts continue
to allow the giant market of NCAA athletics to operate in a noncompetitive and monopolistic manner.
In a recent challenge to the NCAA antitrust exemption, Deppe
v. NCAA, the Seventh Circuit dismissed a student-athlete’s claim
challenging the NCAA’s transfer regulations.7 Specifically, Deppe
challenged the anti-competitiveness of the year-in-residency
requirement, which requires student-athletes transferring schools
to complete one full year of residence at his or her new school before
being eligible for athletic competition.8 The Seventh Circuit
dismissed the year-in-residency challenge because it considered the
regulation to be an eligibility rule, and therefore presumptively
procompetitive pursuant to the precedent set in National Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents.9
Part II of this Comment will provide a background of the
NCAA, antitrust laws, and the history of NCAA antitrust
challenges. Then, Part III will analyze the Seventh Circuit’s
decision to dismiss Deppe’s antitrust challenge to the NCAA’s yearin-residency regulation and further will show why the
procompetitive designation applied to the year-in-residency
regulation is inappropriate. Part III will also discuss the lower
federal courts’ power to narrow precedent from below, as well as the
arguments for and against it. Part IV of this Comment will propose
a practical solution. Ideally, the NCAA should take independent
action and amend the year-in-residency regulation to allow for a
uniform one-time transfer exception tied to academic performance.
While the NCAA has the perfect opportunity to make independent
change and adopt a uniform one-time transfer exception, that
change is unlikely. Therefore, as the NCAA continues to evade real
and necessary change, it is vital that lower federal courts take
matters into their own hands and narrow the Bd. of Regents
precedent from below.
The procompetitive presumption refers to the notion that
NCAA regulations that aim to preserve the tradition of amateurism
in college sports would be deemed inherently procompetitive, and
not in violation of the Sherman Act.10 In other words, if the
challenged regulation relates to the preservation of amateurism it
is automatically not in violation of the Sherman Act. Other scholars
eligibility rules and therefore procompetitive); see also Pugh v. NCAA, 2016 WL
5394408, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 27, 2016) (dismissing the challenge of NCAA
year-in-residency requirement because it is an eligibility rule and therefore not
subject to antitrust laws).
7. Deppe, 893 F.3d at 503.
8. Id. at 499. The Seventh Circuit determined otherwise and held that rule
of reason antitrust framework need not be applied because the NCAA year-inresidency requirement is an eligibility rule and therefore procompetitive. Id. at
503.
9. Id. at 503.
10. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117.
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have previously advocated for federal courts to forego the
procompetitive presumption in NCAA antitrust cases, however,
none have truly analyzed why the federal courts have the inherent
power to narrow NCAA antitrust precedent from below.11 In
addition, recent increases in NCAA student-athlete transfers, as
well as the NCAA’s increasingly inconsistent enforcement of the
year-in-residency regulation, provides federal courts the perfect
opportunity to narrow NCAA antitrust precedent from below.12
In short, the procompetitive presumption should not apply to
the year-in-residency requirement. Rather, the rule of reason
framework must be applied to minimize the impact of the immense
power given to the NCAA by way of the anticompetitive regulations
and actions of its member institutions. Although precedent may not
be on the lower federal courts side, the lower federal courts have the
power and opportunity to narrow NCAA antitrust from below,
finally forcing the NCAA to fully defend its anticompetitive
regulations in a court of law.13

II. BACKGROUND
A. Overview of the NCAA
The NCAA, an organization comprised of four-year institutions
and athletic conferences, imposes certain regulations regarding
student-athlete eligibility of which its member institutions must
comply.14 The NCAA is built on the principle of amateurism and
must retain “a clear line of demarcation between college athletics
and professional sports.”15 Because of the NCAA’s commitment to
amateurism, the organization enacted bylaws with which studentathletes must comply in order to be eligible for competition, as well
as the process by which bylaws are enforced.16 Although the NCAA
and student-athletes do not have an ordinary contractual

11. See Joseph W. Shafer, NCAA Division I Transfers "Are Now Basically
Screwed": The Battle Against the NCAA's Year in Residence Rule in the Seventh
Circuit, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 481 (2018) (advocating for the court to forego the
procompetitive presumption and apply a rule of reason analysis to NCAA
regulations).
12. Berkowitz, supra note 1.
13. Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent From Below, 104
GEO. L. J. 921, 923 (2016).
14. See J. Winston Busby, Playing For Love: Why The NCAA Rules Must
Require A Knowledge-Intent Element To Affect The Eligibility Of StudentAthletes, 42 CUMB. L. REV. 135, 141 (2011/2012) (providing an overview of
NCAA membership and regulatory enforcement guidelines).
15. NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL: AUGUST 2018-19, § 12.01.1 (2018),
www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D119.pdf [hereinafter NCAA
MANUAL].
16. See id. at § 14.1.1 (requiring institutions to ensure their staff and
student-athletes are compliant with NCAA rules).
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relationship, the relationship is implied by way of scholarship
agreements which student-athletes and their respective collegiate
institutions enter into annually.17
As previously mentioned, the NCAA enacts a number of
regulations and bylaws to foster its goal of amateur interscholastic
competition.18 The specific bylaw at issue in this Comment is NCAA
Bylaw 14.5.5.1, otherwise known as the “year-in-residency”
requirement. The text of Bylaw 14.5.5.1 states, “[a] transfer student
from a four-year institution shall not be eligible for intercollegiate
competition at a member institution until the student has fulfilled
a residence requirement of one full academic year (two full
semesters or three full quarters) at the certifying institution."19
In 1973, the NCAA established three separate divisions:
Division I; Division II; and Division III.20 These divisions were
established to “align like-minded campuses in the areas of
philosophy, competition, and opportunity.”21 Division I, the focus of
this Comment, encompasses most of the country’s largest
universities and is seen by many as the first step to a professional
sports career.22
The year-in-residency requirement mandates that any
student-athlete who plays a revenue-generating sport and transfers
to another Division I institution must complete one full academic
year before regaining eligibility for competition.23 The year-inresidency regulation aims to ensure that student-athletes are
comfortable at their new institution before adding increased
pressures of athletic competition, and also seeks to curtail free
agency among the member institutions.24 While on its face, the yearin-residency requirement promotes the NCAA’s objective of
interscholastic athletics, its practical effects are problematic.25 On
17. See Josephine R. Potuto & Matthew J. Mitten, Comparing NCAA And
Olympic Athlete Eligibility Dispute Resolution Systems in Light of Procedural
Fairness and Substantive Justice, 7 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 13 (2016)
(detailing the process of student-athletes annually agreeing in writing to abide
by certain NCAA bylaws, and before signing are directed to review a summary
of pertinent NCAA bylaws and receive regular education on the scope and
meaning of the bylaws that affect them).
18. See Busby, supra note 14 (providing an overview of NCAA membership
and regulatory enforcement guidelines).
19. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, at § 14.5.5.1.
20. Our Three Divisions, NCAA, www.ncaa.org/about/resources/mediacenter/ncaa-101/our-three-divisions (last visited Sept. 29, 2019).
21. Id.
22. Athletic Divisions of the NCAA, C. SPORTS SCHOLARSHIPS,
www.collegesportsscholarships.com/ncaa-divisions-differences.htm (last visited
Sept. 29, 2019).
23. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, at § 14.5.5.1.
24. See Shafer, supra note 11, at 483 (reiterating that the year-in-residency
regulation “seeks to ensure student-athletes are adequately situated at their
new institution before balancing the pressures of competing in Division I
intercollegiate competition”).
25. See id. (reasoning that the current state of collegiate athletics has left
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one hand, coaches often leave athletic programs in search of
lucrative contracts and face no penalties for doing so.26 However,
when a student-athlete seeks to leave a school for a better
opportunity, they must fulfill an entire academic year-of-residency
before being eligible to compete.27
What makes the year-in-residency requirement even more
problematic is that it only applies to Division I institutions, and only
applies to revenue-generating sports (football, basketball, baseball,
and men’s hockey).28 The NCAA made this distinction due to the
increased danger of free agency in NCAA Division I revenuegenerating sports.29 However, this distinction shows that the yearin-residency requirement’s real objective may in fact be to promote
and protect the NCAA’s revenue, not student-athlete eligibility and
amateurism.30

B. The History of NCAA Antitrust Challenges
While the NCAA is classified as a tax-exempt, non-profit
organization, it reported $1.1 billion in revenue during 2017, none
of which was received by the student-athletes.31 Like nearly any
trade association, athletic associations can raise extremely complex
issues for an antitrust analysis.32 In the case of the NCAA, some
amount of collaboration among member institutions is required to
achieve its intended outcomes.33 For instance, the NCAA enacts
rules that inherently restrict output and competition, such as the
year-in-residency requirement.34 Horizontal agreements amongst
competitors, such as the year-in-residency regulation, are generally
considered per se unlawful and a violation of Section I of the
Sherman Act.35 However, the Seventh Circuit in Deppe determined
student-athletes expendable).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Ray Yassar & Clay Fees, Attacking the NCAA's Anti-Transfer Rules
as Covenants Not to Compete, 15 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 221, 225-26 (2005)
(reasoning that the NCAA enforces the year-in-residency regulation on specific
sports because those sports generate the bulk of the NCAA’s interest and
revenue).
31. Scooby Axson, NCAA Reports $1.1 Billion in Revenue, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 7, 2018), www.si.com/college-basketball/2018/03/07/ncaa-1billion-revenue.
32. See Wendy T. Kirby & T. Clark Weymouth, Antritrust and Amateur
Sports: The Role of Noneconomic Values, 61 IND. L. J. 31, 32-33 (1985)
(discussing the different factors and approaches used to analyze NCAA
antitrust challenges).
33. Herbert J. Hovenkamp, The NCAA and The Rule of Reason, 52 REV.
INDUS. ORG., 323, 324 (2018).
34. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120.
35. Id. at 100.
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otherwise.36
Antitrust challenges, such as Deppe’s year-in-residency
challenge, are governed by federal antitrust laws, widely known as
the Sherman Act.37 The Sherman Act promotes and protects
competition within markets.38 Further, it broadly prohibits anticompetitive agreements and unilateral conduct that monopolizes or
attempts to monopolize the relevant market.39 The Sherman Act is
designed to protect consumers from injury that results from
diminished competition.40 Antitrust concerns are established when
regulations produce outcomes that leave customers worse off than
having no regulations at all.41 In other words, for an NCAA
regulation to violate antitrust law, the regulation’s beneficial
purpose must be insufficient to offset the restraint on the market.42
To succeed on an antitrust challenge, a plaintiff must allege an
injury to not only himself, but to the market as well.43 Accordingly,
a plaintiff must prove three elements to succeed under § 1 of the
Sherman Act: “(1) a contract, combination, or conspiracy; (2) a
resultant unreasonable restraint of trade in [a] relevant market;
and (3) an accompanying injury.”44 Federal courts analyze antitrust
challenges through three separate frameworks: rule of reason, per
se, and quick-look analysis.45
The per se rule is employed when a law or regulation facially
appears to be one that will “almost always tend to restrict
competition or decrease output.”46 Under the per se framework, a

36. Deppe, 893 F.3d at 503-04.
37. See The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018)
(establishing the federal antitrust law known as the “Sherman Act” which
prohibits anti-competitive agreements and conduct).
38. See Thomas Baker, Why The Latest NCAA Lawsuit Is Unlikely To
Change Its Amateurism Rules - But Should, FORBES (Sept. 11, 2018),
www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbaker/2018/09/11/the-economics-of-amateurismbreaking-down-the-latest-lawsuit-against-the-ncaa/ (arguing a recent challenge
to NCAA anti violation “represents an opportunity for the court to put an end
to the manipulated market for student-athlete services, even if doing so means
disrupting the way the NCAA currently does business”).
39. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
40. See Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1992) (establishing
the relationship between antitrust laws and NCAA regulations).
41. Kirby & Weymouth, supra note 32.
42. Id.
43. See Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir.
1993) (determining a plaintiff must also allege an injury to the market as a
whole).
44. See Denny's Marina, Inc. v. Renfro Prods., Inc., 8 F.3d 1217, 1220 (7th
Cir. 1993) (creating the required elements a plaintiff must prove in an antitrust
challenge).
45. Agnew, 683 F.3d at 335.
46. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20
(1979) (employing a per se framework when the “practice facially appears to be
one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and
decrease output”).
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restraint is deemed unreasonable without considering the market
context in which the restraint operates.47 The second framework,
the quick-look analysis, is used when the per se framework is
inappropriate.48 Specifically, the quick-look approach is used when
an ordinary observer could determine that the practice would have
an anti-competitive effect on the market.49 Neither the per se nor
quick-look framework is generally applicable to NCAA antitrust
challenges.50 This is because a certain level of cooperation is
necessary for the NCAA and its member institutions to preserve its
market.51
Rule of reason is the framework most frequently applied in
cases involving the NCAA.52 The rule of reason framework requires
a plaintiff to show the defendant has “market power,” and the
defendant would not be able to cause anti-competitive effects on
market pricing without that power.53 Further, the rule of reason
analysis requires the court to determine “the circumstances of the
alleged restraint and balance the anticompetitive and
procompetitive effects of the alleged restraint.”54 If the plaintiff
meets his burden, then the defendant can show the restraint
actually has a procompetitive effect, while the plaintiff can dispute
this claim or show the restraint is not reasonably necessary to
achieve the procompetitive balance.55
Not surprisingly, the NCAA has faced countless lawsuits over
the years, challenging whether NCAA regulations violate federal
antitrust laws by restricting competition.56 These lawsuits have
ranged from challenges to NCAA transfer rules, television
restrictions, and student-athlete compensation.57 However, success
47. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 104 (holding restrictions on NCAA
television rights violate antitrust laws because they substantially decrease
market output).
48. Id. at 100.
49. E.g., Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999) (determining the
quick-look analysis is used when “an observer with even a rudimentary
understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question
would have an anti-competitive effect on customers and markets”).
50. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 103 (determining that the restrictions
should be analyzed under a rule of reason analysis).
51. Id. at 117.
52. See id. at 103 (determining Rule of Reason framework should be applied
to the NCAA’s television restrictions).
53. See Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 822 F.2d 656, 666
(7th Cir. 1987) (defining market power as the “power to raise prices significantly
above the competitive level without losing all of one’s business”).
54. Sarah M. Konsky, An Antitrust Challenge to The NCAA Transfer Rules,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1581, 1588 (2003).
55. Banks, 977 F.2d at 1087.
56. See generally Richard E. Kaye, Application of Federal Antitrust Laws to
Collegiate Sports, 87 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 43 (2014) (detailing the successes and
failures of antitrust challenges to NCAA regulations).
57. Deppe, 893 F.3d 498; Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85; O'Bannon v. NCAA,
802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
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on those claims has been minimal as the NCAA continues to be
exempt from antitrust laws in almost every situation.58 The seminal
case in NCAA antitrust precedent is National Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents.
1. Establishment of NCAA Antitrust Precedent
In Bd. of Regents, the NCAA developed television restrictions
on college football games which allowed only a certain number of
games to be televised each week, and forbade teams from appearing
in televised games more than twice a year.59 When two universities
challenged the television restrictions under § 1 of the Sherman Act,
the Supreme Court determined the television restrictions violated
the Sherman Act because they substantially restricted output.60
Although the Court sided with the plaintiffs in Bd. of Regents
and determined the television restrictions violated the Sherman
Act, the Court also established crucial precedent that NCAA
regulations aimed at preserving the tradition of amateurism in
college sports would be deemed inherently procompetitive, and not
in violation of the Sherman Act.61 Since the Court’s decision in Bd.
of Regents, NCAA regulations have continuously been challenged as
violating antitrust laws.62 However, because of the procompetitive
designation given to regulations by the Court in Bd. of Regents, the
lower federal courts generally adhere to the Bd. of Regents
precedent and allow the NCAA to prevail in nearly every antitrust
challenge.63
2. Affirmance of Bd. of Regents’ Precedent
The precedent set in Bd. of Regents carried over to the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in Agnew v. NCAA.64 In Agnew, the Seventh
58. Gregory M. Krakau, Monopoly and Other Children’s Games: NCAA’s
Antitrust Suit Woes Threaten Its Existence, 61 OHIO ST. L. J. 399, 400 (2000).
59. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 92-94.
60. See id. at 120 (holding “rules that restrict output are hardly consistent”
with preserving the tradition of the NCAA and amateurism).
61. See id. at 117 (declaring that any NCAA regulation aimed at promoting
amateurism will be deemed procompetitive and not subject to antitrust laws).
62. Id. at 120.
63. See Agnew, 683 F.3d at 347-48 (holding that the plaintiffs failed to
establish the existence of a market in challenging NCAA scholarship cap
regulations); see also Bassett v. NCAA, 528 F.3d 426, 433 (6th Cir. 2008)
(holding recruiting and academic regulations are non-commercial in nature and
cannot be subject to antitrust laws); see also Pocono Invitational Sports Camp,
Inc. v. NCAA, 317 F. Supp. 2d 569, 584 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (holding that recruiting
regulations are non-commercial and therefore not subject to antitrust laws).
64. Agnew, 683 F.3d at 348. Former college football players appealed the
decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana
which granted a motion by the appellee, NCAA, to dismiss an action that alleged
that two of the association's bylaws had an anticompetitive effect on the market
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Circuit dismissed a college football player’s antitrust challenge to
the NCAA regulations which limited the amount of scholarships
given per team and prohibited multi-year scholarship agreements.65
Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit determined the scholarship
regulations were not presumptively procompetitive and therefore
subject to antitrust scrutiny.66 However, the Seventh Circuit
dismissed the complaint because it determined the student-athlete
failed to identify a relevant commercial market in which the
anticompetitive effects may be felt.67 The Seventh Circuit’s decision
not to apply the procompetitive presumption to the scholarship
regulations gave hope to future NCAA antitrust challenges that
courts would apply full antitrust analysis to NCAA regulations.68
However, the Seventh Circuit also displaced much of that hope
when it opined that “[m]ost—if not all—eligibility rules, on the
other hand, fall comfortably within the presumption of
procompetitiveness afforded to certain NCAA regulations.”69
In addition to Agnew, numerous other federal courts have
consistently applied the procompetitive presumption to any NCAA
regulation that was considered an eligibility rule or “fit into the
same mold” as such.70 For instance, in Gaines v. NCAA, a college
football player challenged NCAA regulations which declared “a
student-athlete loses his amateur status when he enters a
professional draft or enters into an agreement with an agent.”71 The

for student-athletes in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 332.
65. Id. at 348. The plaintiffs in Agnew were Joseph Agnew and Patrick
Courtney. Id. at 332. Both student-athletes suffered career ending football
injuries and lost their scholarships because of the scholarship regulations
imposed by the NCAA. Id.
66. Id. at 343. The Seventh Circuit concluded the scholarship regulations
did not “fit into the same mold” as eligibility rules. Id. (citing In re NCAA I-A
Walk-on Football Players Litigation, 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1149 (W.D. Wash.
2005) (finding that the limit on the number of scholarships a collegiate team
can offer does not implicate student-athlete eligibility “in the same manner as
rules requiring students to attend class or rules revoking eligibility for entering
a professional draft”)).
67. Agnew, 683 F.3d at 347-48. Plaintiff’s request to amend his complaint
was denied because the plaintiff had multiple opportunities to state a claim for
which relief could be sought. Id.
68. Steve Eder & Ben Strauss, Understanding Ed O’Bannon’s Suit Against
the N.C.A.A., N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2014), www.nytimes.com/2014/06/10/
sports/ncaabasketball/understanding-ed-obannons-suit-against-the-ncaa.html.
The long-term impact of the O’Bannon decision could give colleges and
conferences the option to offer financial incentives to recruits for their publicity
rights. Id.
69. Agnew, 683 F.3d at 343. Although the Seventh Circuit determined the
scholarship regulations were not presumptively procompetitive, the Agnew
opinion has been read to reinforce the precedent set in Bd. of Regents that most
eligibility rules will be considered presumptively procompetitive. Id.
70. Id.
71. Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 740 (M.D. Tenn. 1990); NCAA
MANUAL, supra note 15, at § 12.2.4.2:
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district court dismissed the complaint after determining the
regulations at issue were eligibility rules aimed at maintaining the
integrity of amateur athletics and were therefore presumptively
procompetitive.72 Further, the district court reasoned that the
purpose of the NCAA rules at issue were “to preserve the unique
atmosphere of competition between student-athletes.”73
In addition, in Smith v. NCAA, the Third Circuit applied the
procompetitive presumption to an NCAA bylaw which provided that
a student-athlete may not participate in intercollegiate athletics at
a post-graduate institution different from the institution in which
the student earned his or her bachelor’s degree.74 Once again, the

12.2.4.2 Draft List. An individual loses amateur status in a particular
sport when the individual asks to be placed on the draft list or
supplemental draft list of a professional league in that sport, even
though:
(a) The individual asks that his or her name be withdrawn from the draft
list prior to the actual draft,
(b) The individual's name remains on the list but he or she is not drafted,
or
(c) The individual is drafted but does not sign an agreement with any
professional athletics team
§ 12.3.1:
12.3.1 General Rule. An individual shall be ineligible for participation in
an intercollegiate sport if he or she ever has agreed (orally or in writing)
to be represented by an agent for the purpose of marketing his or her
athletics ability or reputation in that sport. Further, an agency contract
not specifically limited in writing to a sport or particular sports shall be
deemed applicable to all sports and the individual shall be ineligible to
participate in any sport.
72. Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 744. “According to the NCAA Constitution, the
purpose of eligibility rules are to maintain amateur collegiate athletics ‘as an
integral part of the education program and the athlete as an integral part of the
student body and by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between
intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.’” Id.
73. Id.
74. Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998); NCAA MANUAL, supra
note 15, at § 14.1.8.2:
[a] student-athlete who is enrolled in a graduate or professional school
of the institution he or she previously attended as an undergraduate
(regardless of whether the individual has received a United States
baccalaureate degree or its equivalent), a student-athlete who is enrolled
and seeking a second baccalaureate or equivalent degree at the same
institution, or a student-athlete who has graduated and is continuing as
a full-time student at the same institution while taking course work that
would lead to the equivalent of another major or degree as defined and
documented by the institution, may participate in intercollegiate
athletics, provided the student has eligibility remaining and such
participation occurs within the applicable five-year or 10-semester
period . . . .
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Third Circuit determined that the challenged regulation was an
eligibility regulation and therefore, not subject to antitrust
scrutiny.75 The Third Circuit reasoned that eligibility rules are
presumptively procompetitive because they “are not related to the
NCAA’s commercial or business activities.”76
Finally, the federal courts extended the procompetitive
presumption even further in McCormack v. NCAA.77 In
McCormack, a suspended college football program brought an
antitrust suit against the NCAA alleging the restrictions on
compensation to college football players constituted illegal pricefixing.78 The Fifth Circuit determined the NCAA compensation
regulations were not subject to antitrust scrutiny because they were
eligibility rules, and therefore presumptively procompetitive.79 The
Fifth Circuit reasoned eligibility rules are necessary to create and
allow for the survival of college sports “in the face of
commercializing pressures.”80
3. Courts Wavering from NCAA Antitrust Precedent
Although the Supreme Court in Bd. of Regents established the
procompetitive presumption, the Court also found that the NCAAimposed television restrictions violated antitrust laws.81 While it
does not happen frequently, in certain cases the NCAA has refused
to apply the procompetitive presumption.82 For instance, in Law v.
NCAA, a class of college basketball coaches challenged an NCAA
bylaw which limited the amount of earnings specific assistant
coaches could earn.83 The Tenth Circuit refused to apply the

75. Smith, 139 F.3d at 185.
76. Id.
77. See McCormack v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 845 F.2d 1338, 1340
(5th Cir. 1988) (detailing the suspension of the 1987 Southern Methodist
University football program after the NCAA found the program exceeded
restrictions on compensation for student-athletes).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1345.
80. Id.
81. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120.
82. Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998); In re NCAA I-A Walk-On
Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144; O’Bannon, 802 F.3d 1049.
83. Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d at 1014; NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, at §
11.02.3:
Restricted-Earnings Coach. A restricted-earnings coach is any coach who
is designated by the institution's athletics department to perform
coaching duties and who serves in that capacity on a volunteer or paid
basis with the following limitations on earnings derived from the
member institution:
(a) During the academic year, a restricted-earnings coach may receive
compensation or remuneration from the institution's athletics
department that is not in excess of either $ 12,000 or the actual cost of
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procompetitive presumption to the challenged regulation because
there was no evidence that salary restrictions actually enhanced
competition.84 The Tenth Circuit further determined that the
regulation was “nothing more than a cost-cutting measure” that was
not directed towards competitive balance in any way.85
In addition, In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., a
district court once again refused to apply the procompetitive
presumption to an NCAA regulation.86 A group of college football
players challenged the NCAA bylaw that restricted the number of
scholarships awarded by each school.87 The district court found that
the challenged bylaw was not exempt from antitrust scrutiny
because it did not fit into the same mold as the eligibility

educational expenses incurred as a graduate student.
(b) During the summer, a restricted-earnings coach may receive
compensation or remuneration (total remuneration shall not exceed $
4,000) from:
(1) The institution's athletics department or any organization funded in
whole or in part by the athletics department or that is involved primarily
in the promotion of the institution's athletics program (e.g., booster club,
athletics foundation association);
(2) The institution's camp or clinic,
(3) Camps or clinics owned or operated by institutional employees, or
(4) Another member institution's summer camp.
(c) During the summer or the academic year, the restricted-earnings
coach may receive compensation for performing duties for another
department or office of the institution, provided:
(1) The compensation received for those duties outside the athletic
department is commensurate with that received by others performing
those same or similar assignments,
(2) The ratio of compensation received for coaching duties and any other
duties is directly proportionate to the amount of time devoted to the two
areas of assignment, and
(3) The individual is qualified for and is performing the duties outside
the athletic department for which the individual is compensated.
(d) Compensation for employment from a source outside the institution
during the academic year or from sources other than those specified
under 11.02.3-(b) and 11.02.3-(c) above during the summer shall be
excluded from the individual's limit on remuneration.

52.

84. Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d at 1024.
85. Id.
86. In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1151-

87. Id. at 1146-47. The class of plaintiffs were “walk-ons.” Id. Walk-ons are
players who do not receive any athletic scholarship from their school. Joe
Leccesi, The 5 Most Commonly Asked Questions About Being a College WalkOn, USA TODAY SPORTS (Apr. 13, 2017), www.usatodayhss.com/2017/the-5most-commonly-asked-questions-about-being-a-college-walk-on.
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regulations courts have previously declared to be presumptively
procompetitive.88 In line with the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Law,
the district court in this case reasoned that the scholarship
restrictions were developed to reduce costs, not to promote
amateurism.89 While the NCAA appeared to be losing momentum
in its defense of antitrust challenges, Agnew re-solidified the
procompetitive presumption established in Bd. of Regents and
recaptured the momentum for the NCAA.90
While Law and In Re Walk-Ons were important for Deppe’s
likelihood of success, the most important case was O’Bannon v.
NCAA.91 Prior to the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Deppe, the NCAA
was thought to be in its most vulnerable state, due in large part to
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in O’Bannon.92 In O’Bannon, a former
All-American college basketball player initiated an antitrust
challenge to the NCAA’s amateurism rules which prohibited
student-athletes from receiving compensation for their services.93
In O’Bannon, the Ninth Circuit determined the procompetitive
presumption did not apply to the amateurism regulations and that
NCAA rules must be analyzed under a rule of reason antitrust
framework.94 After applying the rule of reason framework to the
facts in O’Bannon, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that NCAA
regulations are subject to federal antitrust laws and must be
analyzed under the rule of reason framework when challenged.95
The decision in O’Bannon established a new framework for
analyzing NCAA antitrust challenges, impacting the future of such
challenges to NCAA regulations. However, the Supreme Court’s
decision not to grant certiorari to hear O’Bannon meant that the Bd.
88. In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1149.
NCAA regulations that the court has considered “eligibility” regulations include
revoking a student-athlete’s amateur status for entering a professional draft
and rules limiting compensation paid to student-athletes. Id.
89. Id.
90. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117; Agnew, 683 F.3d at 343.
91. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d 1049.
92. Michael McCann, What the Appeals Court Ruling Means For O'Bannon's
Ongoing NCAA Lawsuit, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 30, 2015),
www.si.com/college-basketball/2015/09/30/ed-obannon-ncaa-lawsuit-appealscourt-ruling (explaining that “[a]mateurism in college sports may be on life
support, but it’s not dead yet”).
93. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055. Plaintiff Ed O’Bannon initiated a lawsuit
against the NCAA after his friend’s son told him that he was depicted in a
college basketball game although he never consented to the use of his likeness
in the video game. Id.
94. See Ted Tatos, Deconstructing The NCAA’s Procompetitive Justifications
to Demonstrate Antitrust Injury and Calculate Lost Compensation, 62
ANTITRUST BULL. 184, 218-20 (Feb. 15, 2017) (detailing the Ninth Circuit’s
decision to analyze NCAA regulations under rule of reason and the NCAA’s
arguments in defense of procompetitive purpose).
95. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079 (holding that “NCAA regulations are
subject to antitrust scrutiny and must be tested in the crucible of the Rule of
Reason”).
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of Regents precedent would remain intact, effectively leaving the
state of NCAA antitrust challenges in limbo heading into the
Seventh Circuit’s hearing of Deppe.96
4. Deppe’s Year-in-Residency Challenge
The most recent challenge to NCAA eligibility regulations
came in the Seventh Circuit case of Deppe v. NCAA.97 In Deppe, a
college football player challenged the NCAA’s year-in-residency
requirement, which requires student-athletes transferring schools
to complete one year of residency at a school before being eligible for
competition.98 Deppe’s complaint alleged that the year-in-residency
requirement restrained the ability of players to make the best
decision for themselves including those decisions based on
“financial considerations, academic considerations, athletics
considerations, and personal circumstances.”99
Once again, the Seventh Circuit dismissed Deppe’s claims
because it considered the year-in-residency bylaw to be an eligibility
rule, and therefore presumptively procompetitive.100 In determining
that the year-in-residency requirement did not violate antitrust
laws, the Seventh Circuit reinforced the precedent set in Bd. of
Regents, that regulations aimed at protecting eligibility and
promoting amateurism are presumptively procompetitive and
therefore not subject to antitrust laws.101 In short, the Seventh

96. Michael McCann, In Denying O'Bannon Case, Supreme Court Leaves
Future of Amateurism in Limbo, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 3, 2015),
www.si.com/college-basketball/2016/10/03/ed-obannon-ncaa-lawsuit-supremecourt. The denial was expected as the Supreme Court only accepts about one
percent of cases for review and frequently declines to hear class action suits. Id.
97. See Steve Berkowitz, Judge Sides With NCAA in Lawsuit Challenging
D1 Football Transfer Rules, USA TODAY SPORTS (Mar. 7, 2017),
www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2017/03/07/judge-sides-with-ncaalawsuit-challenging-transfer-rules-division-i-schools/98877526/ (analyzing a
federal judge’s decision to dismiss case of college football player challenging
NCAA year-in-residency transfer regulation).
98. See Deppe, 893 F.3d at 500; see also NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, at §
14.5.1.1(a) (requiring year-in-residency before competing unless:
(a) The student is a participant in a sport other than basketball, Division
I-A football or men's ice hockey at the institution to which the student is
transferring. A participant in Division I-AA football at the institution to
which the student is transferring may utilize this exception only if the
participant transferred to the certifying institution from an institution
that sponsors Division I-A football or the participant transfers from a
Division I-AA institution that offers athletically related financial aid in
the sport of football to a Division I-AA institution that does not offer
athletically related financial aid in football).
99. Class Action Compl. at ¶ 4, Deppe v. NCAA, No. 1:16-cv-00528, 2016 WL
888119 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 6, 2017).
100. Deppe, 893 F.3d at 502.
101. See Id. (reasoning that “most NCAA eligibility rules are entitled to the
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Circuit refused to apply the antitrust analysis to the case in Deppe
because the precedent set in Bd. of Regents categorizes the year-inresidency requirement as presumptively procompetitive.102

III. ANALYSIS
While the NCAA was arguably most vulnerable prior to the
Seventh Circuit’s hearing of Deppe, the Seventh Circuit nonetheless
took the safe route and adhered to the procompetitive presumption
established in Bd. of Regents and re-affirmed in Agnew.103 The
procompetitive precedent has survived the test of time, however,
recent decisions such as O’Bannon indicate time is running out for
the NCAA’s freedom from antitrust scrutiny.104 This section will
provide an analysis into the origin, history, and application of the
procompetitive presumption. Further, this section will examine how
Deppe’s case and the year-in-residency requirement do not fit the
mold of traditional eligibility rules, and why federal courts should
follow the lead of the Ninth Circuit in O’Bannon, foregoing the
application of the procompetitive presumption. This section
concludes by analyzing the concept of stare decisis, and the
arguments for and against lower federal courts narrowing
precedent from below.

A. Origin of the Procompetitive Presumption
The procompetitive presumption originated not from the
Supreme Court’s holding, but rather from a portion of dicta in the
case of NCAA v. Bd. of Regents.105 In Bd. of Regents, the NCAA
developed television restrictions on college football games which
allowed only a certain number of games to be televised each week,
and also forbade teams from appearing in televised games more
than twice a year.106 The Supreme Court determined that the
procompetitive presumption announced in Bd. of Regents because they define
what it means to be a student-athlete and thus preserve the tradition and
amateur character of college athletics”).
102. Id.; Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117.
103. Shafer, supra note 11, at 538.
104. Jon Solomon, Q&A: What The O'Bannon Ruling Means For NCAA,
Schools And Athletes, CBS SPORTS (Aug. 9, 2014), www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/news/qa-what-the-obannon-ruling-means-for-ncaa-schools-andathletes/ (explaining that “a federal judge has confirmed what many people have
stated for decades: College football and men's basketball are not amateur
endeavors, they're big business). “[Judge] Wilken had no use for the amateurism
defense to justify the restraints on paying players.” Id.
105. James S. Arico, NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of The University of Oklahoma:
Has The Supreme Court Abrogated The Per Se Rule of Antitrust Analysis, 19
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 437, 450 (1985). “[T]he Supreme Court found that that NCAA’s
role in the preservation of college football’s character could be viewed as
procompetitive.” Id.
106. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 91.
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television restrictions violated antitrust laws because the
restrictions were an unreasonable and unjustifiable restraint of
trade.107 What separates the Bd. of Regents decision from antitrust
challenges like Deppe, is the group that was negatively affected in
each circumstance. In Bd. of Regents, the unreasonable restraint of
trade negatively affected a group of universities, not studentathletes.108 Federal courts are more prone to invalidate NCAA
regulations when they negatively affect a group other than studentathletes.109 In turn, student-athletes are negatively impacted solely
because the NCAA considers them to be amateurs.
The Court in Bd. of Regents likely made its decision because
both a group of universities as well as television viewers were
negatively affected.110 Essentially, the decision in Bd. of Regents did
not necessarily concern student-athletes or NCAA amateurism,
therefore the Supreme Court determined it could invalidate the
regulation.111 Despite this fact, the Bd. of Regents’ decision has been
consistently extended to any NCAA antitrust challenge, regardless
of who the negatively affected parties are.112 While uniformity and
predictability in the law are important, this expansion has led to
federal courts applying a, possibly, inadequate standard of review
to most NCAA antitrust challenges simply because student-athletes
are involved.113
Although the Supreme Court in Bd. of Regents found the NCAA
television restrictions violated antitrust laws, the Supreme Court
also established crucial precedent that NCAA regulations aimed at
preserving the tradition of amateurism in college sports would be
deemed inherently procompetitive, and not in violation of the
Sherman Act.114 In a single sentence that has stood the test of time,
Justice Stevens stated “[i]t is reasonable to assume that most of the

107. Id. at 98.
108. Id. Many of the NCAA antitrust challenges have come from studentathlete plaintiffs. Id. However, in Bd. of Regents the challenge came directly
from NCAA member universities, specifically the University of Oklahoma and
the University of Georgia. Id.
109. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 91; Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d at 1010;
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1049.
110. Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2011),
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-collegesports/308643/.
111. Id.
112. Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its Second Century: Defender of
Amateurism or Antitrust Recidivist?, 86 OR. L. REV. 329, 337 (2007). “Even
when the plaintiff was not a student-athlete challenging amateurism or
eligibility standards, the NCAA generally prevailed.” Id.
113. Jonathan Jenkins, A Need for Heightened Scrutiny: Aligning the NCAA
Transfer Rule with its Rationales, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 439, 461-62
(2006).
114. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117 (determining that “most of the
regulatory controls of the NCAA are justifiable means of fostering competition
among amateur athletic teams and therefore procompetitive”).
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regulatory controls of the NCAA are justifiable means of fostering
competition among amateur athletic teams and therefore
procompetitive because they enhance public interest in
intercollegiate athletics.”115 While this dicta may have been wellreasoned at the time of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bd. of
Regents, the current state of the NCAA is far different than it was
in 1984, and thus courts should take this into consideration.116
Throughout the 1983 NCAA Division I football season only 242
football games were nationally televised.117 Today, every major
Division I football conference is tied to long-term television deals in
which the majority of the games are televised.118 If the Supreme
Court thought the NCAA could unreasonably restrain trade in 1984,
then its capability to do so now is surely far greater.119
Because of the procompetitive presumption established in Bd.
of Regents, the majority of NCAA antitrust challenges have been
dismissed at the pleadings stage.120 In turn, student-athletes like
Peter Deppe are forced to abide by the “cartel-like” regulations set
by the NCAA without ever having the opportunity to force the
NCAA to defend its unlawful restraints of trade under a full rule of
reason analysis.121 However, it is important to note that although

115. Id. The Supreme Court made the decision not to apply the per se
antitrust framework because a “certain degree of cooperation is necessary if the
type of competition that petitioner and its member institutions seek to market
is to be preserved.” Id.
116. Emma Kerr, The NCAA as Modern Jim Crow? A Sports Historian
Explains Why She Drew the Parallel, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 12, 2018),
www.chronicle.com/article/The-NCAA-as-Modern-Jim-Crow-A/242240.
Student-athletes, coaches, and the general public are becoming increasingly
aware of the unfair and oppressive nature of the NCAA and its treatment of
student-athletes. Id.
117. Fred Barbash, Supreme Court Breaks NCAA Hold On Televised College
Football Games, WASH. POST (June 28, 1984), www.washingtonpost.com/
archive/politics/1984/06/28/supreme-court-breaks-ncaa-hold-on-televisedcollege-football-games/35c9aace-baf7-4dfd-af14-f7bcc702b0c9/. Not only did
universities benefit from the decision in Bd. of Regents, but many independent
networks and local television stations will benefit as well. Id.
118. Jeremy Fowler, In Big-Money Marriage Of TV And College Football,
Who Has Most Say, CBS SPORTS (Jul. 4, 2013), www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/news/in-big-money-marriage-of-tv-and-college-football-who-has-mostsay/ (stating that “the Big Ten used to broadcast 16 to 18 football games a year”
but “[n]ow, the Big Ten Network alone nearly triples that total”).
119. See B. David Ridpath, The College Football Playoff and Other NCAA
Revenues Are an Exposé of Selfish Interest, FORBES (Jan. 17, 2017),
www.forbes.com/sites/bdavidridpath/2017/01/17/college-football-playoff-andother-ncaa-revenues-is-an-expose-of-selfish-interest/#33ac757e4e1a (referring
to current spending of Division I colleges as “out of control commercialism”).
120. Babette Boliek, Is the NCAA Dam About to Burst, AM. ENTERPRISE
INST. (Apr. 5, 2018), www.aei.org/publication/is-the-ncaa-dam-about-to-burst/.
From 1973-2015 there were thirty-seven antitrust cases brought against the
NCAA, only six cases made it past the motion to dismiss stage and only one
case, O’Bannon, succeeded on part of its merits. Id.
121. See Jenkins, supra note 113. Although the NCAA is technically a “non-
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the Supreme Court’s decision in Bd. of Regents has been applied as
binding precedent, the amateurism issue was dealt with merely in
dicta.122 Therefore, NCAA amateurism has technically yet to receive
the Court’s “full attention and analysis.”123 So while most federal
courts have generally adhered to the procompetitive presumption
established in Bd. of Regents, they may not actually be bound by
it.124 In fact, dicta are sometimes not followed, and can often be
narrowed.125 In short, absent the Supreme Court granting certiorari
to hear a NCAA amateurism case, the lower courts’ only option is to
adhere to the Board of Regents precedent, or make the bold decision
to narrow the precedent from below.126

B. The “Year-in-Residency” Regulation is Not an
Eligibility Rule
The Supreme Court in Bd. of Regents ultimately determined
that any regulation “defining the conditions of the contest, the
eligibility of the participants, or the manner in which members of a
joint enterprise shall share the responsibilities and benefits of the
total venture” will be considered presumptively procompetitive.127
After the decision in Bd. of Regents, federal courts have consistently
held that any NCAA regulation relating to eligibility is considered
presumptively procompetitive, and therefore no antitrust analysis
is necessary.128
Agnew was one of the most recent and crucial cases for the
NCAA and its defense of its anti-competitive regulations.129 At first
glance, the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Agnew appears to be a blow
to the NCAA and the procompetitive presumption that has long
been applied to NCAA’s “amateurism” bylaws.130 However, just as
profit” organization, it operates similarly to a cartel by controlling every aspect
of the competitive process. Id.
122. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117.
123. Asim S. Raza, Should the NCAA’s Eligibility Rules Be Subjected to The
Sherman Antitrust Act, 4 DEPAUL J. ART. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 113, 117
(1993). In NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, the Court did not directly decide the legality
of NCAA amateurism rules but rather considered the rules necessary to
preserve the NCAA’s product. Id.
124. See Re, supra note 13 (explaining how narrowing from below allows a
lower court judge to “acknowledge that the precedent must remain binding in
circumstances where it unmistakably applies, while also reducing the
precedent’s scope of application in cases of precedential ambiguity”).
125. Andrew C. Michaels, The Holding-Dicta Spectrum, 70 ARK. L. REV. 661
(2017).
126. Id.
127. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117.
128. Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 748; McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1346-47; Smith,
139 F.3d at 190.
129. Agnew, 683 F.3d at 328.
130. See id. at 347-48 (determining the cap on scholarships and prohibition
of multi-year scholarships were not presumptively procompetitive but the court
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in the case of Agnew, various federal courts have used the
procompetitive presumption to dismiss claims at the outset that
they feel do not warrant a full antitrust analysis.131
In effect, after Agnew, the procompetitive presumption applies
any time that the NCAA bylaw in question helps to “preserve a
tradition that might otherwise die” or to “preserve the studentathlete in higher education.”132 Even more, the Seventh Circuit in
Agnew determined that almost every eligibility rule will fit within
the presumption of procompetitiveness.133 What makes this
precedent troublesome is that federal courts will determine a given
NCAA regulation is an eligibility rule merely because it is featured
in the eligibility section of the NCAA Manual.134 This creates the
notion that any given NCAA regulation will be considered an
eligibility regulation simply because the NCAA says it is.135
While the procompetitive presumption may have increased the
efficiency of the courts in deciding NCAA antitrust challenges
quickly, it has also denied many complainants the right to force the
NCAA to justify its anticompetitive actions under a full rule of
reason antitrust analysis.136 In fact, O’Bannon was the sole NCAA
amateurism challenge in which the plaintiffs won on the merits of
the case.137 Surely with the vast amount of NCAA amateurism
challenges consistently presented to various federal courts, one
would assume the plaintiffs would have occasional success.
However, that is not the case.138
Following the procompetitive presumption set in Bd. of
Regents, numerous federal courts have consistently applied the
procompetitive presumption to any NCAA regulation that was
still reinforced the Bd. of Regents precedent).
131. Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 748; McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1346-47; Deppe,
893 F.3d at 503-04.
132. See Agnew, 683 F.3d at 342 (citing Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120
(declaring that the NCAA must have “ample latitude” to preserve amateurism
in college sports)).
133. See id. at 343 n. 6 (stating “[w]e need not touch upon the debate of
whether all eligibility rules or just most eligibility rules are due a presumption,
as the Bylaws at issue in this case are not, in fact, eligibility rules”).
134. See Deppe, 893 F.3d at 502 (determining that the year-in-residency
regulation was an eligibility regulation because it was listed in the “Eligibility”
section of the NCAA Manual).
135. Joshua Senne, A Review of the NCAA’s Business Model, Amateurism,
and Paying the Players, SPORT J. (Dec. 23, 2016), www.thesportjournal.org/
article/a-review-of-the-ncaas-business-model-amateurism-and-paying-theplayers/ (declaring that “[i]t can be stated that the NCAA sought to strengthen
its governing power over amateurism by the slow integration and adoption of
more rules and regulations”).
136. Boliek, supra note 120. From 1973-2015 there were thirty-seven
antitrust cases brought against the NCAA. Id. Only six cases made it past the
motion to dismiss stage and only one case, O’Bannon succeeded on part of its
merits. Id.
137. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079.
138. Boliek, supra note 120.
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considered an eligibility rule or “fit into the same mold” as eligibility
rules.139 In effect, the procompetitive presumption has been applied
to caps on the number of scholarships available, transfer
regulations, and compensation for student-athlete name and
likeness.140 Of course, these regulations do touch on eligibility and
amateurism, however, that does not mean that they are necessary
to preserve the nature of collegiate athletics.141 Nearly every
regulation enacted by the NCAA will indirectly affect amateurism,
as amateurism is the basis of collegiate athletics.142 The year-inresidency regulation certainly concerns eligibility because it denies
a student-athlete immediate eligibility when transferring from one
school to another.143 However, it also concerns the amount of
scholarship funding available to a transferring student-athlete.144
While the year-in-residency requirement concerns eligibility, it is
not solely an eligibility regulation.145 In effect, the NCAA is allowed
to completely control every aspect of the market in an unreasonably
restrictive manner, just because its regulations indirectly concern
eligibility.146 This shows why the NCAA should be forced to defend
its unreasonable restraints of trade under a full rule of reason
analysis.

C. “Year-in-Residency” Regulation is Not the Least
Restrictive Alternative
The Ninth Circuit in O’Bannon determined that even if a
regulation serves a procompetitive purpose, it can still be invalid
under a rule of reason analysis if a less restrictive alternative is
139. Id.
140. Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 748; McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1346-47; Deppe,
893 F.3d at 503-04.
141. Cf. Audrey C. Sheetz, Student-Athletes vs. NCAA: Preserving
Amateurism in College Sports Amidst the Fight for Player Compensation, 81
BROOK. L. REV. 865, 869 (2016) (opining that “[i]n order to maintain studentathletes’ amateur status while simultaneously complying with antitrust law,
this note argues that the NCAA should develop a more hands-off regulatory
approach that best serves student-athletes by allowing schools to enter into a
revenue sharing system similar to the model used by the International Olympic
Committee”).
142. Zachary Stauffer, NCAA President Defends Amateurism in College
Sports, PBS (June 19, 2014), www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/ncaapresident-defends-amateurism-in-college-sports/.
143. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, at § 14.5.5.1.
144. See Kay Jennings, What’s a College Football Scholarship Worth,
Anyway?, BLEACHER REP. (Mar. 8, 2012), www.bleacherreport.com/articles/
1094781-so-whats-a-college-football-scholarship-worth-anyway (stating the
amount of scholarship aid given to student-athletes varies depending on the
university).
145. Id.
146. Joe Nacora, Opinion, The College Sports Cartel, N.Y. TIMES Dec. 31,
2011, at A23. www.nytimes.com/2011/12/31/opinion/nocera-the-college-sportscartel.html.
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available.147 So while the year-in-residency regulation serves a
procompetitive purpose in prohibiting free-agency and preserving
amateurism, if a less restrictive alternative could serve the NCAA’s
purpose just as well then the regulation should be invalid under a
rule of reason analysis.148 The less restrictive alternative element is
of utmost importance to NCAA antitrust challenges, like the yearin-residency challenge in Deppe. This is because it is clear that
numerous less restrictive alternatives to the year-in-residency
regulation are available and the NCAA would likely lose if forced to
defend against a full rule of reason analysis.149
Numerous alternatives to the year-in-residency rule have been
suggested, many of which would serve the NCAA’s objective of
promoting amateurism and prohibiting free agency just as well.150
For instance, a uniform academic transfer rule allowing for a onetime unrestricted transfer would accommodate student-athletes,
while still preserving amateurism and limiting the NCAA’s free
agency concerns.151 This one-time transfer exception would likely be
a proper less restrictive alternative, because it is currently
permitted in all other NCAA sports, aside from the Division I
revenue-generating sports.152 If the rest of NCAA athletics can
survive and prosper without the year-in-residency requirement,
then it is likely not necessary for the preservation of amateurism.153

D. Narrowing NCAA Antitrust Precedent from Below
While the numerous federal courts have applied the
procompetitive presumption to any NCAA regulation relating to
eligibility, courts have refused to apply the procompetitive
presumption when dealing with a regulation that does not “fit into
the same mold” of an eligibility regulation.154 Not surprisingly,
federal courts have given extreme deference to the NCAA’s
definition of eligibility which has led to seemingly unfair and
inadequate results.155 However, recent cases have narrowed the
147. O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1063-64 (holding “a restraint that serves a
procompetitive purpose can still be invalid under the Rule of Reason if a
substantially less restrictive rule would further the same objectives equally
well”).
148. Id.
149. See Shafer, supra note 11, at 541-52 (proposing a form of controlled free
agency where students would be allowed a one-time transfer if they meet certain
criteria such as good academic standing).
150. See id. at 547 (outlining a less restrictive alternative to the year-inresidency rule that is tied to academic performance).
151. Id. at 548-53.
152. Alex Kirshner, NCAA Transfer Rules, Explained Quickly and Honestly,
SB NATION (May 9, 2018), www.sbnation.com/college-football/2018/5/9/173117
48/ncaa-transfer-rules-change-guide-list-sit-out.
153. Id.
154. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S at 117.
155. See Kristen R. Muenzen, Weakening Its Own Defense? The NCAA's
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scope of the procompetitive presumption.156
In Law and In Re Walk-Ons, the respective federal courts
refused to apply the procompetitive presumption to NCAA
regulations that did not “fit into the same mold” of an eligibility
regulation.157 Like the case in Law and In Re Walk-ons, a strong
argument can be made that the year-in-residency regulation does
not “fit into the same mold” of eligibility regulations either.158 In
affirming the Bd. of Regents precedent, the Seventh Circuit in
Agnew reasoned that an eligibility regulation is one that is
“essential to the very existence of the product of college
[athletics].”159 When applying this reasoning to the year-inresidency regulation, it does not appear that the year-in-residency
regulation is “essential to the very existence of college [athletics].”160
Of course, the NCAA’s concerns of uncontrolled free agency are
valid, however the year-in-residency regulation can hardly be said
to be “essential to the very existence of college [athletics].”161
Division II and Division III sports are able to operate effectively
without the year-in-residency requirement.162 Even more, every
non-revenue generating Division I sport operates effectively
without the year-in-residency requirement.163 In short, while the
year-in-residency requirement may be essential to preserving the
NCAA’s profit, it is not “essential to the very existence of college
[athletics].”164
Version of Amateurism, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 257, 261 (2003) (arguing “if
the NCAA is to use the amateurism defense in antitrust claims, it must note
that it is the NCAA's definition of amateurism that is being used, and that this
definition incorporates non-traditional exceptions to the amateurism ideal”).
156. O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079.
157. Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d at 1024; In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football
Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1144.
158. Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d at 1024; In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football
Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1144.
159. Agnew, 683 F.3d at 343; Darren Heitner, 7th Circuit Sides With NCAA,
Finds Year-In-Residence Rule Presumptively Procompetitive, FORBES (June 26,
2018), www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/2018/06/26/7th-circuit-sides-withncaa-finds-year-in-residence-rule-presumptivelyprocompetitive/#395b4280664a.
160. Agnew, 683 F.3d at 343.
161. Id. The NCAA recently allowed a transferring Division I football player
an exception to the year-in-residency requirement for "documented mitigating
circumstances.” David Kenyon, How NCAA Transfer Rules Incentivize Players
to Expose CFB's Dark Side, BLEACHER REP. (Aug. 23, 2018),
www.bleacherreport.com/articles/2792151-how-ncaa-transfer-rulesincentivize-players-to-expose-cfbs-dark-side.
162. Konsky, supra note 54, at 1586. “The broadest exception to the transfer
rules, allowing student-athletes a one-time transfer without penalty,
specifically excludes participants in Division I basketball, football, and men's
ice hockey. Id. Other exceptions, such as those for discontinued sports, military
service, or discontinued academic programs, are quite narrow and unlikely to
apply to many students.” Id.
163. Id.
164. Agnew, 683 F.3d at 343.
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While these cases are important, their precedential value is of
little importance to complainants like Peter Deppe.165 Because these
decisions came from federal district courts, federal courts are
essentially still bound by the Supreme Court’s decision in Bd. of
Regents.166 However, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in O’Bannon
provided encouragement for future NCAA antitrust challenges.
In O’Bannon, the Ninth Circuit took the NCAA antitrust
analysis in a different direction by refusing to apply the
procompetitive justification.167 The Ninth Circuit’s decision
appeared to be the final straw for the NCAA and its defense of
amateurism and antitrust challenges, however, because the
Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari to hear the case, the
Ninth Circuit’s holding is not binding precedent and the fate of
NCAA amateurism is essentially in limbo.168
In effect, O’Bannon overruled the procompetitive presumption
created in Bd. of Regents, and established that every NCAA
regulation is subject to antitrust scrutiny, and even procompetitive
regulations can be invalid under a rule of reason analysis.169 So
while the Seventh Circuit in Deppe had a chance to follow the Ninth
Circuit’s lead in O’Bannon, the Seventh Circuit played the safe
route, and adhered to the procompetitive presumption established
in Bd. of Regents.170 Because the Supreme Court continues to evade
the issue of NCAA amateurism, lower federal courts are sadly left
with very few options in deciding NCAA antitrust challenges.171
Perhaps lower federal courts could begin to narrow the Bd. of
Regents decision from below, however, courts are ever-so reluctant
to engage in such a practice.172
Based on the continuous NCAA antitrust challenges flooding
federal district courts, it seems that it may be time for Supreme
Court to revisit NCAA amateurism and decide the NCAA

165. Michael Wells, The Unimportance of Precedent in the Law of Federal
Courts, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 357, 359 (1990). The Supreme Court has low regard
for precedent. Id.
166. Id.
167. O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1063-64 (holding “a restraint that serves a
procompetitive purpose can still be invalid under the Rule of Reason if a
substantially less restrictive rule would further the same objectives equally
well”).
168. McCann, supra note 92. “Amateurism in college sports may be on life
support, but it’s not dead yet.” Id.
169. Id.
170. Dave Stafford, 7th Circuit Affirms Tossing Suit Challenging NCAA 1Year Rule, IND. LAW. (June 26, 2018), www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/
47414-th-circuit-affirms-tossing-suit-challenging-ncaa-1-year-rule.
171. Daniel Fisher, Right Or Wrong, Precedent Will Decide O'Bannon Case
In Favor Of NCAA, FORBES (July 21, 2014), www.forbes.com/sites/
danielfisher/2014/07/21/right-or-wrong-precedent-will-decide-obannon-case-infavor-of-ncaa/#7dc5c74f70a1.
172. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85.
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amateurism issue directly.173 However, with the Supreme Court’s
refusal to grant certiorari to hear O’Bannon, it is unlikely the NCAA
will be forced to defend itself, and its anti-competitive rules in the
Supreme Court.174

E. Lower Federal Courts’ Power to Narrow Precedent
from Below
There is a strong legal argument that lower courts must adhere
to Supreme Court precedent, however, as evidenced by the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in O’Bannon, lower federal courts have the
inherent power to narrow Supreme Court precedent from below.175
In fact, the principal values behind stare decisis indicate narrowing
is legitimate, so long as the conditions are right.176
Stare decisis refers to the courts’ practice of deferring to past
precedent.177 Importantly, stare decisis has been relied on by the
federal courts since the nation's founding, reflecting a policy
judgment that “in most matters it is more important that the
applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”178 The
United States’ legal system was designed to promote stare decisis
because it provides consistency by way of “predictability, fairness,
appearance of justice, and efficiency.”179 While these values are
certainly important, opponents of stare decisis criticize the fact that
“none of these values depend on the precedent being correct.”180 In
effect, strict adherence to stare decisis “can tend to calcify the law,
causing age-old precedent to linger despite developments in other
areas of law and society.”181 NCAA antitrust precedent is the perfect
example of an age-old precedent remaining intact, despite
developments in antitrust law and the nature of the NCAA’s
operations.
“Narrowing” is defined as “interpreting a precedent not to
apply when it is best read to apply.”182 Although the Bd. of Regents

173. See Michael McCann, NCAA Amateurism to Go Back Under Courtroom
Spotlight in Jenkins Trial, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Apr. 2, 2018),
www.si.com/college-football/2018/04/02/ncaa-amateurism-trial-judge-wilkenmartin-jenkins-scholarships (arguing the Jenkins case is a long way from the
finish line but it may be the best opportunity for a change in NCAA amateurism
laws).
174. Id.
175. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079.
176. Re, supra note 13, at 936. The principal values of vertical stare decisis
are correctness, practicality and candor. Id.
177. Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United
States, 12 NEV. L.J. 787, 789 (2012).
178. Id. at 792 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997)).
179. Mead, supra note 177, at 792.
180. Id. at 793.
181. Id. at 794.
182. Re, supra note 13, at 927-28.
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precedent may be best read to apply in the case of a year-inresidency challenge, the circumstances surrounding the issue
suggest narrowing is legitimate.183 The procompetitive presumption
was established in dicta in Bd. of Regents.184 Importantly, stare
decisis applies only to holdings of announced precedents, not
dicta.185 Nonetheless, federal courts have consistently treated the
procompetitive presumption as binding precedent.
Not only is the Bd. of Regents precedent built on dicta, but the
entire field of antitrust law is vulnerable to becoming outdated and
inapplicable, and therefore, courts are more willing to overrule
antitrust precedent than other areas of law.186 Even more, the lower
federal courts’ inconsistent treatment of NCAA antitrust challenges
shows that it may be time to place practicality and correctness over
adhering to precedent.187 While stare decisis is an integral element
of American jurisprudence, sometimes precedent must be narrowed
in the interest of uniformity, practicality and correctness.188

IV. PROPOSAL
While the procompetitive presumption established in Bd. of
Regents has stood the test of time, the current state of the NCAA
and the continuous antitrust challenges it faces, indicate that
change is inevitable.189 In terms of the year-in-residency regulation,
there are a number of ways to achieve the necessary change. Ideally,
the NCAA would take the proactive approach and amend the yearin-residency regulation to allow for a one-time transfer exception
and adopt a uniform policy across all divisions and sports. In the
alternative, the lower federal courts can follow the Ninth Circuit’s
lead in O’Bannon and take matters into their own hands and
narrow NCAA antitrust precedent from below.190
183. Id. at 936. The principal values of vertical stare decisis are correctness,
practicality, and candor. Id.
184. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117.
185. Id.
186. Daniel M. Tracer, Stare Decisis in Antitrust: Continuity, Economics,
and the Common Law Statute, 12 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 1, 2 (2013).
187. Barrett Sallee, Miami QB Tate Martell Granted NCAA Hardship
Waiver for Immediate Eligibility in 2019 Season, CBS SPORTS (Mar. 19, 2019),
www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/miami-qb-tate-martell-granted-ncaahardship-waiver-for-immediate-eligibility-in-2019-season/. In the most recent
inconsistent application of the year-in-residency rule, the NCAA recently
granted University of Miami quarterback, Tate Martell, immediate eligibility
after transferring from Ohio State University. Id. Martell received a hardship
waiver despite having any real hardship. Id.
188. Re, supra note 13, at 936.
189. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117.
190. See Narrowing Second Amendment Precedent From Below, RE’S
JUDICATA (Jan. 14, 2016), www.richardresjudicata.wordpress.com/2016/01/14/
narrowing-second-amendment-precedent-from-below/ (defining “narrowing” as
when a court interprets a precedent not to apply where the precedent is best
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Scholars have argued against the federal court application of
the procompetitive presumption in the past, however, none have
specifically analyzed the lower federal court’s power to take matters
into its own hands, and narrow NCAA antitrust precedent from
below.191 Importantly, the procompetitive presumption was
established in dicta rather than the holding of Bd. of Regents.192 In
addition, antitrust law is constantly evolving, as it is prone to
becoming outdated rather quickly.193 The NCAA has inconsistently
applied the year-in-residency regulation which makes the year-inresidency regulation the ideal NCAA regulation for the courts to
narrow NCAA antitrust precedent from below.194 The lower courts
do not owe outdated antitrust dicta precedential weight and should
be encouraged to forego the procompetitive presumption, thereby
forcing the NCAA to fully defend its year-in-residency regulation in
a court of law.

A. NCAA Action - Impose an Academic Transfer
Standard
The obvious solution to the NCAA antitrust problem is for the
NCAA to take action to amend the year-in-residency rule and adopt
a uniform transfer policy allowing for a one-time transfer exception
across all divisions and sports. The NCAA has recently
implemented significant changes to its transfer rules, however, the
changes were not as sweeping as many had hoped.195 Although one
source indicated there was a “95%” chance that changes to the
current transfer legislation would be adopted in 2018, the NCAA
ultimately moved away from extending the one-time transfer
exception to all sports.196 However, the NCAA did implement a
read to apply).
191. Shafer, supra note 11.
192. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117; Thomas A. Baker III & Natasha T.
Brison, From Bd. of Regents to O’Bannon: How Antitrust and Media Rights
Have Influenced College Football, 26 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 331, 333 (2016)
(arguing if Justice Stevens had to decide O’Bannon v. NCAA, he would not have
sided with the NCAA’s reliance on his dicta from NCAA v. Bd. of Regents).
193. Barak Orbach, Antitrust Stare Decisis, 15 ANTITRUST SOURCE 1 (2015).
194. Matthew J. Mitten, Why and How the Supreme Court Should Have
Decided O’Bannon v. NCAA, 62 ANTITRUST BULL. 62 (2017). The Supreme Court
denied the petition to hear O’Bannon v. NCAA despite conflicting rulings among
courts regarding whether eligibility rules are unlawful restraints of trade. Id.
195. Ralph D. Russo, As Leagues Debate Transfer Rules, NCAA Moves
Toward Reform, USA TODAY (May 31, 2018), www.usatoday.com/story/sports/
ncaaf/2018/05/31/as-leagues-debate-transfer-rules-ncaa-moves-towardreform/35557657/. “The NCAA is about two weeks away from finally making
some substantial reforms to transfer rules. The changes will not be quite as
extensive as some had hoped and the work is not complete, but considering
previous failed attempts, getting anything accomplished on transfers can be
counted as a success.” Id.
196. Matt Schick (@ESPN_Schick), TWITTER (Jan. 17, 2018, 8:54 AM),
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change in the transfer rules which prohibited coaches from blocking
a student-athlete’s decision to transfer to a specific school.197 Bob
Bowlsby, Commissioner of one of the NCAA’s most influential
conferences, The Big 12 Conference, indicated that the change came
as a way to diminish control from the coaches and institutions, and
give the power to the student-athletes.198
The NCAA also recently amended its “red-shirt” rule. A “redshirt” refers to a student-athlete who is enrolled full time at a
university but does not participate in his or her sport for an entire
academic year for the exclusive purpose of saving a year of
competition.199 The changes to the red-shirt rule allow Division I
football players the option to play in up to four games in a season
before invoking their “red-shirt” and therefore preserving a year of
athletic eligibility.200 The Chairman of the Division I Council,
University of Miami Athletic Director, Blake James, said the rule
change “promotes not only fairness for college athletes, but also
their health and well-being.”201
While these changes were incremental, it clearly shows that
there are indeed less restrictive alternatives to the NCAA’s transfer
rules that should be analyzed by federal courts under a full rule of
reason analysis.202 The NCAA should adopt uniform transfer rules
for all sports and divisions because it will continue to face antitrust
challenges in the future, and action is likely needed to keep those
attacks at bay. The simplest and most cost-efficient way to limit
future attacks is to change the year-in-residency rule and adopt
uniform transfer rules allowing for a one-time transfer.203
The best way to structure this new transfer policy would be to
twitter.com/ESPN_Schick/status/953671983866277888.
197. Associated Press, As Leagues Debate Transfer Rules, NCAA Moves
Toward
Reform,
SALT
LAKE
TRIB.
(May
31,
2018),
https://www.sltrib.com/sports/2018/06/01/as-leagues-debate-transfer-rulesncaa-moves-toward-reform/.
198. Id.
199. Transfer Terms, NCAA, www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/current/
transfer-terms (last visited Oct. 1, 2019).
200. Alex Kirshner, College Football Players Can Now Play Up To 4 Games
Without Burning a Redshirt, SB NATION (June 13, 2018), www.sbnation.com/
college-football/2018/6/13/17460076/ncaa-redshirt-rule-change-2018.
201. Id.
202. NCAA Looking At More Changes To Transfer Rules, USA TODAY (Oct.
7, 2018), www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2018/10/05/ncaa-looking-atmore-changes-to-transfer-rules/38063937/ (explaining that “the NCAA Division
I Council has introduced legislation that would allow some athletes to transfer
during the summer and be immediately eligible to play for a new school if there
is a head coaching change before the first day of fall classes”).
203. Cf. Jared Anderson, New Proposal Would Require All NCAA Transfers
To Sit Out One Year, SWIM SWAM (May 11, 2018), www.swimswam.com/newproposal-would-require-all-ncaa-transfers-to-sit-out-one-year/ (detailing a new
proposal that “would extend the NCAA’s ‘year in residence’ requirement to all
sports, requiring all transfers to sit out a full year before rejoining NCAA
competition”).
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install an academic transfer standard that would tie immediate
eligibility for competition after transfer to a set of academic
benchmarks, regardless of what sport or division the athlete
participates in.204 While the NCAA is concerned about uncontrolled
free agency, extending the one-time transfer exception would not
reach that result.205 Enacting a uniform one-time transfer exception
rule to all sports will not create unlimited free agency.206
The NCAA would obviously need to install certain procedures
to ensure that student-athletes are not able to transfer at-will.207
Most importantly, student-athletes would need to meet specific
academic requirements to be eligible to transfer.208 Specifically, any
athlete seeking to utilize the one-time transfer exception would
need to maintain a GPA of 2.5 or higher.209 Also, the window of time
in which student-athletes can transfer would have to be limited to
ensure student-athletes are not commandeered mid-season.210
Finally, student-athletes would have to initiate the transfer
themselves, and coaches would not be allowed to contact studentathletes first.211 Just as in the NCAA’s recent “notification of
transfer” rule change, players will inform their school of their
decision to transfer and the student’s name will be entered into a
national database.212 This change is legitimately possible because
the one-time transfer exception is currently available to all Division
II and III student-athletes, as well as Division I student-athletes
who do not participate in revenue-generating sports.213 In short,
student-athletes would get a one-time pass to change schools within
their five-year eligibility clock, but would not be able to transfer atwill. If this change was implemented, cases like Deppe would not
exist.
Not only would the one-time transfer exception help the
student-athletes, but it would also benefit the market because a

204. Shafer, supra note 11, at 548.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Division I Two-Year College Transfer Requirements, NCAA,
www.ncaa.org/about/division-i-two-year-college-transfer-requirements
(last
visited Oct. 1, 2019). The NCAA currently requires all two-year college studentathletes maintain a 2.5 GPA before being eligible to play immediately at a fouryear Division I institution. Id.
210. Shafer, supra note 11, at 548.
211. Id.
212. See Michelle Brutlag Hosick, New Transfer Rule Eliminates
Permission-To-Contact Process, NCAA (June 13, 2018), www.ncaa.org/about/
resources/media-center/news/new-transfer-rule-eliminates-permission-contactprocess (detailing the national transfer database for transfers).
213. Anderson, supra note 203. The year-in-residency regulation “is only in
place for five NCAA sports: football, hockey, baseball, men’s basketball and
women’s basketball. In all other sports, an athlete is immediately eligible to
compete, provided they receive a release from their former school.” Id.
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whole new market for student-athlete services would arise.214
Although the one-time transfer exception may be used by some to
advance their careers, numerous other factors influence studentathletes to transfer.215 For example, student-athletes may elect to
transfer because of disagreements with a harsh coach, academic
reasons, or personal reasons.216 The NCAA’s concerns about
unlimited free-agency are legitimate, however, student-athletes
should be allowed the opportunity to make a calculated decision
about what is in their best interest without being penalized with a
year of lost eligibility.217
Even more, the market would benefit because the one-time
transfer exception would place important decisions in the hands of
student-athletes rather than the coaches, who currently have too
much power and leverage in the NCAA transfer process.218 The
academic transfer rule would go a long way in lessening the gap in
power between the coaches and student-athletes.219 In effect, just as
coaches are able to leave a school and participate immediately at a
new school, student-athletes would be able to as well.220
In addition to the one-time academic transfer exception, the
NCAA should allow for one-time transfer exception in the event a
student-athlete’s head coach leaves the school. The year-inresidency bylaw currently allows for a waiver of the year-inresidency if the student-athlete can show substantial adversity or
other mitigating circumstances.221 While in the past the NCAA has
very rarely granted such waivers,222 in more recent years the NCAA
has granted waivers for circumstances such as NCAA sanctions,
coaches leaving, and racist events.223 While it is encouraging to see
214. Shafer, supra note 11, at 551.
215. See Jared K. Richards, Shelley L. Holden, & Steven F. Pugh, Factors
That Influence Collegiate Student-Athletes to Transfer, Consider Transferring,
or Not Transfer, 21 SPORT J. (2016), thesportjournal.org/article/factors-thatinfluence-collegiate-student-athletes-to-transfer-consider-transferring-or-nottransfer/ (listing the reasons student athletes transfer “include choosing the
wrong school socially or academically, choosing the wrong coach or playing style,
losing interest in the sport, getting injured, or having poor academic
performance”).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See John Grupp & Scott Brown, Can Anything Be Done To Stop College
Football Coaches From Jumping Ship?, TRIB LIVE (Dec. 8, 2012),
www.triblive.com/sports/college/ncaa/3084026-85/coach-coaches-texas (finding
that at least twenty percent of FBS football teams had a head coaching change
between the 2011 and 2012 football seasons).
220. Deppe, 893 F.3d 498. Peter Deppe would be allowed to leave his school
for a better opportunity just as his coach did. Id.
221. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, at § 12.8.4.
222. Shafer, supra note 11, at 493.
223. Tony Barnhart, Mr.CFB/Tony Barnhart: Martell Case Could Change
Landscape of College Football, TMG SPORTS (Jan. 30, 2019),
www.collegesportsmaven.io/tmg/tony-barnhart/mr-cfb-tony-barnhart-martell-
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the NCAA increasingly grant waivers, it would be beneficial for both
the NCAA and student-athletes to have clearly established criteria
for what constitutes substantial adversity or mitigating
circumstances. A student-athlete’s head coach leaving the school
should qualify as a mitigating circumstance and the NCAA should
be encouraged to solidify this.
The NCAA has implemented incremental change in its transfer
rules, however, the change may not be enough to keep the legal
attacks at bay.224 The NCAA is built solely off of student-athletes,
and would not exist without them.225 Surely, granting studentathletes a fair and level playing field would be in the best interest
of the student-athletes, the NCAA, and the market altogether.

B. What the Lower Federal Courts Should Do
If NCAA action does not come willingly, a class of studentathletes should challenge the year-in-residency requirement in the
Ninth Circuit, where the court has already determined the Bd. of
Regents’ precedent can be narrowed from below.226 In support of its
challenge, the student-athletes should be sure to emphasize three
factors. First, the Bd. of Regents precedent is built on dicta.227
Second, stare decisis has a limited application in the field of
antitrust.228 And third, the O’Bannon decision should provide
encouragement to the lower federal courts to continue to narrow
NCAA antitrust precedent from below.229 While the NCAA,
Congress, and the Supreme Court each have the opportunity to
change the outdated NCAA antitrust precedent, each group appears
uneager to do so. For that reason, lower federal courts should follow
the lead of the Ninth Circuit in O’Bannon and narrow the Bd. of
Regents precedent from below.

case-could-change-landscape-of-college-football-7T4tIjquJEC9q_AjrnMi1g/.
224. Alex Kirshner, The NCAA Just Made It A Lot Riskier For Players To
Seek Transfers, SB NATION (June 19, 2018), www.sbnation.com/collegefootball/2018/6/19/17481492/ncaa-transfer-rule-changes-2018. Although there
were numerous benefits to the NCAA’s transfer changes, players are at risk of
losing their scholarship upon notifying their school of their intent to transfer.
Id.
225. Ramogi Huma, The NCAA Empire Is Built On The Sweat, Talent -- And
Harm -- Of Its Players, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2015), www.latimes.com/opinion/oped/la-oe-huma-ncaa-football-union-lawsuits-20150111-story.html (stating that
“those who run NCAA sports — administrators, coaches and universities —
enjoy multimillion-dollar salaries in a multibillion-dollar industry built on the
talent, sweat and hard work of college athletes”).
226. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117.
227. Id.
228. Orbach, supra note 193.
229. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079.
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1. Narrow the Procompetitive Presumption Precedent from
Below
Lower federal courts narrowing the procompetitive
presumption from below is the most likely way real change will
come to the NCAA’s transfer rules and, specifically, the year-inresidency rule. While the Supreme Court appears disinterested in
hearing a NCAA antitrust case, lower federal courts can force the
Supreme Court’s hand, or at the very least put pressure on the
NCAA to implement change on its own.230 The Ninth Circuit’s
decision in O’Bannon was certainly a step in that direction, and
should be followed in future NCAA antitrust cases.
There are generally two reasons why lower federal courts will
narrow Supreme Court precedent. First, lower federal courts
narrow ambiguous precedents that have become outdated as a
result of new events or technologies.231 Second, lower federal courts
sometimes narrow from below to force the Supreme Court to
reconsider its own decisions.232 The possibility of narrowing from
below is possible in the case of NCAA antitrust challenges for two
reasons. To start with, the Bd. of Regents precedent was established
in dicta, rather than the Supreme Court’s actual holding.233 In
addition, the Supreme Court has shown it will overturn antitrust
doctrines that it considers no longer consistent with competition
policy or economic theory.234
a. Dicta Are Not Binding
As mentioned throughout this Comment, the procompetitive
presumption was established in dicta in Bd. of Regents.235
Importantly, stare decisis applies only to holdings of announced
precedents.236 For that reason, the Ninth Circuit in O’Bannon
determined it was not bound by the precedent and that NCAA
regulations must be analyzed under rule of reason framework.237
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion was a perfect example of a lower federal
court narrowing from below, and is also an example that should be
followed in the future. In narrowing the Bd. of Regents’ application,
the Ninth Circuit determined “we are not bound by Bd. of Regents
to conclude that every NCAA rule that somehow relates to

230. Re, supra note 13, at 956. “[B]y construing higher court precedent
narrowly, courts can provoke higher court review.” Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117.
234. Tracer, supra note 186.
235. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117.
236. Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 953, 955 (2005).
237. O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1063.
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amateurism is automatically valid.”238 The Ninth Circuit’s decision
was made possible by the fact that the procompetitive presumption
was dicta, rather than the Supreme Court’s actual holding.239
Dicta is defined as "[a] judicial comment made while delivering
a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the
case and therefore not precedential."240 There’s a very clear
distinction between holdings and nonessential dicta in that
holdings are entitled to deference from future courts, while dicta are
expendable.241 This distinction has allowed the Ninth Circuit in
O’Bannon to narrow the Bd. of Regents precedent, and should
encourage lower federal courts to do so in the future.
b. Antitrust Precedent is Easiest to Narrow/Overturn
It is important to note that stare decisis has a somewhat
modified application in the area of antitrust.242 The Supreme Court
has opted to reexamine and change antitrust laws on numerous
occasions.243 The Supreme Court’s treatment of antitrust precedent
should encourage lower federal courts to adopt a modified
application of stare decisis to NCAA antitrust challenges as well.
The modified application of stare decisis in antitrust, as well as the
fact that the procompetitive presumption was built on dicta, makes
it likely that lower federal courts can continue to narrow the Bd. of
Regents’ precedent from below.
c.

Ninth Circuit Narrowed the Procompetitive Presumption
in O’Bannon

In O’Bannon, the Ninth Circuit narrowed NCAA antitrust
precedent by declining to apply the procompetitive presumption to
NCAA student-athlete licensing restrictions.244 Likewise, when the
next year-in-residency challenge reaches a federal court, the court
should decline to apply the procompetitive presumption. By
declining to apply the procompetitive presumption, the court will
force the NCAA to defend the year-in-residency regulation under a
full rule of reason analysis. Under a rule of reason analysis, the
NCAA will have to show that the year-in-residency rule is the least238. Id.
239. Id. “The Court's long encomium to amateurism, though impressivesounding, was therefore dicta.” Id.
240. Dicta, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
241. See, e.g., Dicta, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining dicta
as "not precedential").
242. Tracer, supra note 186.
243. Id.
244. O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1063-64 (holding “a restraint that serves a
procompetitive purpose can still be invalid under the Rule of Reason if a
substantially less restrictive rule would further the same objectives equally
well”).
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restrictive alternative. Consequently, it is unlikely that the NCAA
will be able to show that the year-in-residency rule is the leastrestrictive alternative because much less restrictive alternatives
are already in place for every college sport and division besides the
Division I revenue-generating sports.
2. The Plan of Attack Going Forward
A class of student-athletes should challenge the year-in-residency
requirement in the Ninth Circuit, where the court has already
determined the Bd. of Regents’ precedent can be narrowed from
below.245 In support of its challenge, the student-athletes should be
sure to emphasis three factors. First, the Bd. of Regents precedent
is built on dicta. Second, stare decisis has a limited application in
the field of antitrust. And third, the O’Bannon decision should
encourage the court to continue to narrow NCAA antitrust
precedent from below.246 It is clear that the circumstances
surrounding NCAA antitrust challenges leaves the precedent prone
to narrowing by the lower federal courts. But, would a year-inresidency challenge have any real likelihood of that treatment from
the courts? Because the sole purpose of the year-in-residency rule is
to restrict the athletes, and there are numerous less restrictive
alternatives available, a year-in-residency challenge does have a
chance to receive favorable treatment from below.

V. CONCLUSION
The year-in-residency regulation is an outdated regulation that
restricts the ability of student-athletes, like Peter Deppe, to do what
is best for their athletic, academic, and personal livelihood.
Although the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Deppe was discouraging
for the future of changing the year-in-residency rule, there is hope
for subsequent challenges. While it would be ideal for the NCAA to
take a proactive approach and adopt a uniform one-time transfer
exception across all sports and divisions, there is no real likelihood
that the NCAA will take action without pressure from the courts.
Because the NCAA will likely not act on its own, the lower
federal courts should follow the Ninth Circuit’s lead and narrow
NCAA antitrust precedent from below. Not only has the Supreme
Court supported a modified application of antitrust stare decisis,
but the procompetitive precedent is founded on dictum.247 Further,
245. Mark Brnovich & Ilya Shapiro, Split Up the Ninth Circuit-But Not
Because It’s Liberal, CATO INST. (Jan. 11, 2018), www.cato.org/publications/
commentary/split-ninth-circuit-not-because-its-liberal. The Ninth Circuit is the
favored court by many plaintiffs because it has shown a willingness for
progressivism. Id.
246. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079.
247. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117.
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the lower federal courts should be encouraged by the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in O’Bannon and determine that the procompetitive
presumption does not apply.
Justice Scalia once said that, even if dicta are "repeated" over
time, they are “not owed stare decisis weight.”248 Scalia went on to
say that dicta are not binding on the Supreme Court or the inferior
courts.249 Hopefully, a new class of plaintiffs will be inspired by the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in O’Bannon and will continue to fight for
the rights of student-athletes, like Peter Deppe. The procompetitive
presumption established in Bd. of Regents is outdated and
inapplicable to an NCAA antitrust challenge like the year-inresidency rule. The only way real change will come, is if the lower
federal courts utilize their inherent power and take matters into
their own hands.

248. CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1884 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
249. Id.
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